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PROBABILISTIC STANDARDS OF PROOF, THEIR 
COMPLEMENTS AND THE ERRORS THAT ARE 
EXPECTED TO FLOW FROM THEM 
David Hamer∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Probability theory provides insights into the levels at 
which standards of proof are set. An analysis is 
provided of the rates of errors that flow from different 
standards, a necessary element of which is an 
assumption as to the level of certainty achieved in the 
flow of cases. Where one party is required to satisfy a 
standard of proof, a complementary standard is 
imposed on the other party. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Factual accuracy is the ‘paramount’1 goal of the civil or criminal 
trial. In this article I use probability theory to understand the role 
 
∗  Lecturer, University of New England Law School. I am grateful to Geoff 
Hamer for his insightful comments on a draft of this article. 
1  Marvin E Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View’ (1975) 123 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1031, 1033, 1055. The goal of 
factual accuracy has also been described as ‘foremost’ (Adrian S 
Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence (1989) 7), ‘fundamental’ 
(Vern R Walker, ‘Preponderance, Probability and Warranted Fact-
finding’(1996) 62 Brooklyn Law Review 1075, 1081), ‘principal’ (Jonathan 
Koehler and Daniel N Shaviro, ‘Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict 
Accuracy through the use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods’ 
(1990) 75 Cornell Law Review 247, 250), ‘overriding’ (William Twining, 
Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (1985) 117), ‘necessary’ 
(William Twining, ‘Rationality and scepticism in judicial proof: some 
signposts’ (1989) II International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 69, 72), 
‘primary’ (ibid 70) and ‘central’ (Jack Weinstein, ‘Some difficulties in 
devising rules for determining truth in judicial trials’ (1966) 66 Columbia 
Law Review 223, 243). 
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played by the ordinary2 civil and criminal standards of proof in 
the law’s pursuit of factual accuracy.  
Standards of proof inform the fact-finder of the basis on which a 
version of facts should be adopted. It might be argued that the 
standard best designed to achieve factual accuracy is obvious — 
demand absolute certainty. If the fact-finder is certain that the 
defendant is not liable, a finding should be made for the 
defendant. If the fact-finder is certain of the defendant’s liability, 
a finding should be made for the plaintiff or prosecution. If the 
fact-finder is uncertain, no finding should be made.  
This view is of course hopelessly idealistic. The material facts 
are not available for inspection by the fact-finder, but must be 
inferred from incomplete and inconclusive evidence.3 Perhaps a 
fact-finder might occasionally feel totally certain about the 
material facts, but arguably she should not. The better view is 
that ‘[i]n the real world of human actions we can never be 
absolutely certain of anything’.4 If certainty was a prerequisite to 
judgment, very few decisions would be made, if any. While the 
system would have the appearance of pursuing the goal of factual 
accuracy, other objectives would be severely compromised. 
There would be no peaceful resolution of civil disputes,5 creating 
the danger that the parties may take matters into their own hands. 
Criminals would go unpunished; there would be no deterrence, 
 
2  This article does not consider the question of intermediate or flexible 
standards. For a more general discussion see David Hamer, ‘The Civil 
Standard of Proof Uncertainty: Probability, Belief and Justice’ (1994) 16 
Sydney Law Review 506; Mike Redmayne, ‘Standards of Proof in Civil 
Litigation’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 167; Charles R Williams, 
‘Burdens and Standards in Civil Litigation’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 
165. 
3  As has long been recognised: see W Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of 
Evidence Scholarship’ (1982), in Enid Campbell and Louis Waller, Well 
and Truly Tried: Essays on Evidence (1982). 
4  Barbara Shapiro, ‘“To a Moral Certainty”: Theories of Knowledge and 
Anglo-American Juries 1600–1850’ (1986) 38 Hastings Law Journal 153, 
193; see also Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970), 370 (Harlan J). 
5  See eg Charles Nesson, ‘Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The 
Value of Complexity’ (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 1187, 1194; John 
Thibaut, and Laurens Walker, ‘A Theory of Procedure’ (1978) 66 
California Law Review 541.  
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rehabilitation or retribution.6 And while limitless resources were 
being consumed, there would be an absence of closure for the 
parties and the community.7 
The legal system is realistic. It does not demand the unattainable. 
Standards of proof, even the criminal standard, are recognised as 
inherently ‘probabilistic’.8 This is not to say that factual accuracy 
is sacrificed in favour of other more pragmatic ends. On the 
contrary, in this article I support the now ‘conventional’9 view 
that standards are set at levels of probability that minimise the 
costs of factual error. As explained in Parts II and III below, the 
ordinary civil standard of 50 per cent minimises the subjective 
expected rate of error while the criminal standard is set at a 
higher level to reduce the risk of the more costly error — the 
wrongful conviction. However, it must be recognised that the 
more the standard is increased, the greater the risk of the other 
error, the erroneous acquittal. 
Clearly the level at which a standard is set will have an impact on 
the rates of the different kinds of errors. As far as the standard of 
proof is concerned, to reduce the risk of one kind of error is to 
increase the risk of the other. The trade-off is inescapable. But 
error rates are not solely determined by the standard of proof. 
Regard must also be had to the degree of certainty attained by the 
fact-finder in the flow of cases. All else being equal, the greater 
the fact-finder’s certainty, the more possible it is to avoid error. 
The mathematical relationship between the probability 
distribution of the cases, the standard of proof and error rates is 
explored below in Part IV. 
 
6  See eg Charles Nesson, ‘The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and 
the Acceptability of Verdicts Thesis’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 1357, 
1359; Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice 
(1949) 101.  
7  Weinstein, above n 1, 242. 
8  Eg Victor v Nebraska 511 US 1 (1994) 14, 22 (O’Connor J), but contrast 25 
(Ginsburg J, conc), 36 (Blackmun J, diss). See also Re Winship 397 US 358 
(1970), 370 (Harlan J). 
9  Dale Nance, ‘Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof’ (1998) 49 
Hastings Law Journal 621, 622. See also Ron Allen et al, ‘Probability and 
Proof in State v Skipper: An internet exchange’ (1995) 35 Jurimetrics 
Journal 277 (22 August 1994) 309 (Friedman R). 
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Recognition of the probabilistic nature of the standard of proof 
— placing it at a certain position on the unit interval — leads 
immediately to an instructive corollary. There is, with regard to 
each issue at trial, not a single standard, but two complementary 
standards, one for each of the opposing parties. Talk of the 
criminal defendant’s standard of proof may appear inconsistent 
with the presumption of innocence. However, such a concern 
should be addressed through careful instruction on burdens of 
proof. As outlined in Part V, an appreciation of the 
complementary corollary should lead to a better understanding 
and clearer instruction on the criminal standard, including those 
where the prosecution relies exclusively upon circumstantial 
evidence.  
II THE ORDINARY CIVIL STANDARD: MINIMISING 
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED RATE OF ERROR 
The ordinary civil case is symmetrical.10 The plaintiff and the 
defendant have an equal stake in the proceedings. The parties 
may, for example, be arguing as to who should bear the loss of 
an unsuccessful business dealing. The law seeks to treat the 
parties even-handedly. In the United States it is commonly held 
that the civil standard of proof requires the fact-finder to adopt 
the plaintiff’s version of facts where they are established to a 
‘preponderance of probability’ or a ‘preponderance of 
evidence’.11 In England and Australia, the predominant formula 
is that the plaintiff must establish her case on a ‘balance of 
probabilities’.12 Many authorities hold that these formulations 
can be interpreted as ‘more probable than not’ and as setting a 
standard of 50 per cent.13 Putting to one side the burden of proof, 
 
 
10  Arguably, where this symmetry is not present and the defendant has more at 
stake than the plaintiff, the standard should increase or an intermediate 
standard should be imposed. See above, n 2. 
11  Eg Grogan v Garner 498 US 279 (1990), 286. 
12  Eg Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 
449; Re H [1996] AC 563, 586. 
13  Eg Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970), 371–372 (Harlan J); Bradshaw 
v McEwans Pty Ltd (unreported, High Court of Australia, Dixon, Williams, 
Webb, Fullager and Kitto JJ, 27 April 1951), quoted in Holloway  
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which is generally borne by the plaintiff, the standard of proof is 
equally demanding on both parties. Each party will be concerned 
to demonstrate that her version of facts is more probable than the 
other party’s competing version.  
This standard minimises the risk of error in the instant case, and 
minimises the subjective expected rate of errors in civil 
litigation.14 If a plaintiff proves her case to a probability of 60 per 
cent, a verdict will be rendered for the plaintiff and, in the fact-
finder’s view, this verdict will probably be correct. If ten 
plaintiffs proved their cases to a level of 60 per cent, all would 
succeed. Six of these verdicts would be expected to be factually 
correct, and four factually incorrect, though which were which 
would be unclear. Of course it would be preferable for all ten 
verdicts to be factually correct, but given the limitations of the 
evidence, this is not achievable. Expected accuracy would not be 
increased by increasing the standard of proof. If the standard 
were raised to, say, 65 per cent, the defendant would be 
successful in each of the ten cases. However, the fact-finder 
would then consider only four verdicts to be factually correct, 
and six to be factually incorrect. By increasing the standard of 
proof, the subjective expected rate of factually correct verdicts 
would be reduced. As these very simple examples demonstrate, 
there is a close relationship between the standard of proof and 
expected rates of the different kinds of errors, mediated by the 
probability distribution over the set of cases in question. The 
mathematical relationship between these three things will be 
examined in more detail below. First, however, I should clarify 
what is meant by subjective expected rate of errors.  
The errors with which we are concerned in the present context 
are, of course, factual errors. The verdicts referred to in the 
examples above will all be legally correct in the sense that they 
were rendered in accordance with the appropriate standard of 
proof.15 However, a legally correct verdict may nevertheless be 
 
 
v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470, 480–1 (Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ); 
Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207, 219 (Lord Simon); Hamer, above n 1, 509. 
14  David Kaye ‘Naked statistical evidence’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 601. 
15  Compare Zuckerman, above n 1, 122. Hay’s recent economic analysis of 
burdens of proof appears inexplicably to focus entirely on legal error. He is 
concerned, inter alia, to minimize ‘the costs of erroneous outcomes’. (Bruce 
L Hay, ‘Allocating the Burden of Proof’ (1997) 72 Indiana Law Journal 
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factually incorrect, in that the verdict is premised upon a version 
of the material facts that does not correspond with what really 
transpired.16 The converse is also true. A legally incorrect verdict 
— one based, for example, on highly probative but inadmissible 
evidence — may be factually correct.17 The same point can be 
made of inductive reasoning in general. Where evidence is 
incomplete or ambiguous, and it is not possible to eradicate all 
doubt, valid reasoning may unavoidably lead to factual error.18 
 
651, 651.) However, he defines a correct or ‘meritorious’ outcome as one 
where the ‘the evidence supports the claim’ (657), and an ‘erroneous 
outcome, as we have defined it, occurs when the party whom the evidence 
supports nonetheless loses’ (662). His definition of error has no reference to 
any lack of correspondence between the material facts, as found, and what 
really occurred. His model appears to totally ignore the costs of error that 
flow from the unavailability and incompleteness of evidence.  
16  The correspondence theory of truth has been criticised for its ‘naïve and 
outdated view that the outside world is able somehow to impress itself on 
our senses without change or remainder’: Bernard Jackson, ‘Semiotic 
Scepticism: A Response to Neil MacCormick’ (1991) IV International 
Journal for the Semiotics of Law 175, 178; see also John Jackson ‘Two 
Methods of Proof in Criminal Procedure’ (1988) 51 Modern Law Review 
549, 558. However, the charge of naivety does not appear warranted in the 
present context. An acknowledged difficulty in proving real world events 
provides the raison d’être of standards of proof. Perhaps it could be said 
that it would be naïve even to aspire to establish a correspondence. 
However, such an extreme scepticism about the possibility of knowing the 
outside world is as open to criticism as the most naïve realism. ‘[B]oth take 
for granted the relationship between evidence and reality’. ‘Instead of 
dealing with the evidence as an open window, contemporary sceptics regard 
it as a wall, which by definition precludes any access to reality.’ Carlo 
Ginzburg ‘Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian’, in James 
Chandler, Arnold I Davidson, and Harry Harootunian (eds), Questions of 
Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines (1994) 
290, 294; Steven L Winter, ‘The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between 
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 
2225, 2244; William Twining, Rethinking Evidence, Exploratory Essays 
(1990) 96. 
17  See also Zuckerman, above n 1, 122; Andrew D Leipold, ‘The Problem of 
the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1297, 1298 fn 9; Henry L Chambers, ‘Reasonable Certainty and 
Reasonable Doubt’ (1998) 81 Marquette Law Review 655, 658 fn 11. 
18  See also Detlof Von Winterfeldt, and Ward Edwards, Decision Analysis 
and Behavioral Research (1986) 2–3; Zuckerman, above n 1, 19; Willem A 
Wagenaar, Peter van Koppen, and Hans Crombag, Anchored Narratives: 
The Psychology of Criminal Evidence (1993) 14.  
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And conversely, invalid reasoning may lead to factually correct 
results.  
The statement that a 50 per cent standard of proof will minimise 
the rate of error is qualified in two respects — it states an 
expectation which is based upon what is commonly termed a 
subjective probability assessment. Taking the subjectivity point 
first, the fact-finder’s assessment of the probability of liability 
will generally lack the objective appearance of a probability 
based on statistical data or knowledge of the structure of a game 
of chance. Juridical fact-finders’ assessments are rarely 
quantified, and if they were, it would be surprising to find 
different fact-finders arriving at precisely the same figure. For 
this reason, my use of probability theory in the analysis of human 
degrees of belief falls within what is generally termed the 
‘subjective theory’ of probability.19 It may be questioned whether 
the term ‘subjective’ is entirely appropriate in a couple of 
respects. First, some commentators argue that all probability 
assessments are subjective in the sense of being subject to a 
limited body of evidence. Probability, it is said, is not a feature of 
the world, but is an expression of partial belief based upon our 
limited knowledge of the world.20  
More importantly in the present context, the term ‘subjective’ 
might be considered to carry the connotation of relativism.21 
Critics of the subjective theory have suggested that it exhibits 
‘great tolerance’22 about different interpretations of evidence, 
 
 
19  Eg Henry Kyburg, and Howard Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability 
(1964); Peter Ayton and George Wright (eds), Subjective Probability 
(1994).  
20  Eg Richard Wright, ‘Causation, Responsibility, Probability, Naked 
Statistics and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts’ 
(1988) 73 Iowa Law Review 1001, 1041; Bernard Robertson, and G 
Anthony Vignaux, ‘Probability—The Logic of the Law’ (1993) 13 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 457, 469–70.  
21  This leads Ayton and Wright to suggest that ‘personalist’ may be a better 
term than ‘subjective’ (Peter Ayton and George Wright, ‘Subjective 
probability: What should we believe?’, 165 fn 1, in Wright and Ayton (eds) 
above n 19). However, the term ‘subjective probability’ appears in the title 
of their article, and the book in which it appears.  
22  Eg, Wesley C Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference (1967) 81; 
see also Kyburg and Smokler, above n 19, 7; James Logue, ‘Weight of 
evidence, resiliency and second order probabilities’, in Ellery Eells and 
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placing the correctness of probability assessments ‘wholly 
outside the framework of rational controversy because it is not an 
objective issue’.23 These criticisms are not necessarily fair. 
Rigorously applied, the subjective theory is capable of 
reconciling the divergent assessments of different individuals.  
Suppose two jurors differ in their assessments of the probative 
value of evidence of flight from the police.24 The standard 
measure of probative value within the subjective probability 
theory is the Bayesian likelihood ratio.25 Juror X has had few and 
favourable experiences of the police and considers a guilty 
person would be far more likely to flee than an innocent person. 
He views the evidence as strongly incriminating and gives it a 
high likelihood ratio: Lx(F) >> 1.
26 Juror Y has had far less 
pleasant experiences of police practices and considers flight an 
understandable response to police investigation irrespective of 
guilt. She views the evidence as having very little probative 
value on the question of guilt: LY(F) ≈ 1.
27 While the jurors have 
interpreted the flight evidence quite differently, the inequality, 
Lx(F) ≠ LY(F), should not be considered as probabilistically 
 
Tomasz Maruszewski (eds), Probability and Rationality: Studies on  
L. Jonathan Cohen’s Philosophy of Science (1991) 155.  
23  Jonathan Cohen, ‘Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the 
Gatecrasher’ [1981] Arizona State Law Journal 627, 630; see also Patrick 
Suppes, ‘The Qualitative Theory of Probability’, in Wright and Ayton (eds), 
above n 19, 31; Salmon, above n 22, 81.  
24  Compare Richard E McGarvie, ‘Equality, Justice and Confidence’ (1996) 5 
Journal of Judicial Administration 141, 145.  
25  Bayes’ theorem provides a means of updating a prior probability 
assessment to take account of new evidence. In its odds-likelihood form, the 
posterior odds of a proposition, G, given the fresh evidence, F, is equal to 
the product of the prior odds of the proposition, and the likelihood ratio for 
the evidence: O(G|F) = O(G) x L(F). 
 L(F) is defined as P(F|G)/P(F|¬G) where ‘¬’ is the negation symbol, 
meaning ‘not’. Note that odds are a function of probability, o(p) = p/(1 – p), 
and vice versa, p(o) = o/(1 + o). 
 Bayes’ theorem is so central to applications of the subjective theory, that 
it is alternatively known as the Bayesian theory: R D Friedman, ‘A 
Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law 
Review 873, 874–5; David Kaye, ‘Introduction: What is Bayesianism?’ in 
Peter Tillers and Eric Green (eds), Probability and Inference in the Law of 
Evidence: The Limits and Uses of Bayesianism (1988) 1, 9.  
26  The symbol ‘>>’ means ‘much greater than’.  
27  The symbol ‘≈’ means ‘is roughly equal to’. 
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incomprehensible.28 To resolve the apparent inconsistency we 
need ‘to be as clear as possible about the conditioning’.29 If we 
label each juror’s background evidence BX and BY, then the 
inequality becomes perfectly understandable: L(F|Bx) ≠ 
L(F|BY).
30 The jurors assessments differ because they are, in a 
real sense, assessing different bodies of evidence. This is not to 
say that all differences of opinion can be reconciled in this 
fashion. But if they can not, then rather than tolerating 
inconsistency, the subjective theory can be a vehicle for 
interrogating it.31 
The second qualification to the proposition that a 50 per cent 
standard will minimise errors is that this merely states an 
expectation. And, where legal trials are concerned, confirming 
that expectation will be virtually impossible. In this respect a 
contrast can be drawn with the more explicitly probabilistic 
activity of betting. Offered even odds, a bettor would be advised 
to select the more probable side of the bet, since this offers the 
greater expectation of winning. She would then have the 
opportunity to see whether she made the right choice. Betting is a 
predictive activity offering the bettor the opportunity to gather 
evidence that is generally conclusive. Indeed, the obtaining of 
such conclusive evidence is crucial to the activity of betting; if 
there was a common uncertainty as to which horses or lottery 
tickets were winners, gambling would be far less popular than it 
is. The courts, however, are usually engaged in postdiction — 
proof of past events.32 As time passes the evidence tends to 
 
 
28  The symbol ‘≠’ means ‘is not equal to’. 
29  Ian W Evett and Bruce S Weir, Interpreting DNA Evidence: Statistical 
Genetics for Forensic Scientists (1998) 8; see also Robertson and Vignaux 
above, n 29, 470. 
30  Stating the former likelihood ratio in full, L(F|Bx) = 
P(F|G&BX)/P(F|¬G&BX). 
31  Not that such a task would be easy. On the contrary, it is ‘an open-ended 
problem, since there is no end to the variety of complicated information that 
might be contained in B; and therefore no end to the complicated 
mathematical problems of translating that information into numerical 
values’: Edwin Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science 
(Fragmentary Edition of March 1996) 213. 
32  Occasionally courts are involved in predictive proof which raise another set 
of problems: see David Hamer, ‘“Chance would be a fine thing”: Proof of 
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decline in quality: memories fade, forensic traces deteriorate and 
documents are shredded.33 After the trial it will become 
increasingly difficult to confirm the accuracy of the fact-finder’s 
verdict.34 
In isolated cases an external observer may be able to form a view 
with virtual certainty that a verdict is factually correct or 
incorrect. She may have reference to crucial additional evidence 
that was inadmissible or unavailable at trial, giving her greater 
certainty than was available to the juridical fact-finder. However, 
the twin objectives of efficiency and finality place an obstacle in 
the path of those that would prove the existence of errors. If a 
reopening of the first determination is allowed, why should the 
second determination not also be questioned?35 The underlying 
problem — the absence of a ‘criterion’36 or ‘gold standard’37 for 
checking postdictions — is intractable. 
And so it must be acknowledged that the proposition that the  
50 per cent standard maximises factual accuracy is subject to 
qualification. ‘If the judge’s estimates are good, so that we can 
 
causation and quantum in an unpredictable world’ (1999) 23 Melbourne 
University Law Review 557; Wright, above n 20. 
33  See also Jonathan Cohen, ‘Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the 
Gatecrasher’ [1981] Arizona State Law Journal 627, 632.  
34  Kaye suggests the distinction between postdictive trials and predictive bets 
is merely one of degree (David Kaye, ‘The Laws of Probability and the 
Laws of the Land’ (1979) 47 University of Chicago Law Review 34, 45). 
With enough resources, and ‘sufficiently brutal methods’, questions about 
the material facts could ‘in theory, be settled’. Meanwhile, there may be 
‘some residual uncertainty’ about the subject of a bet, such a horse race: 
‘The picture of the supposed winner may have been taken from an improper 
angle, it may have been doctored, or the laws of optics may have been 
suspended by a sinister force during the exposure. It is all a matter of 
degree.’ Generally though, the distinction is quite clear-cut.  
35  Jackson v Virginia 443 US 307 (1979), 337 fn 12 (Stevens J conc) citing 
Paul M Bator, ‘Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners (1963) 76 Harvard Law Review 441, 450–1, 450–451; see 
also Daniel Givelber, ‘Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do 
We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?’ (1997) 49 Rutgers Law Review 1317. 
36  Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, above n 18, 182. 
37  Michale L DeKay, ‘The Difference between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios 
and Probabilistic Standards of Proof’ (1996) 21 Law and Social Inquiry 95, 
125. 
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take them as accurate statements of the probability of X ...’38 
‘Assuming a positive correlation between the fact-finder’s belief 
and the true state of affairs ...’39 It is true that it is generally not 
possible to determine whether the expected accuracy benefits of 
the probabilistic standard of proof are achieved. Nevertheless, the 
50 per cent standard is highly defensible in ordinary civil cases.40 
The alternative is to set the standard at a level that is subjectively 
expected to increase the rate of error.41  
III THE CRIMINAL STANDARD: MINIMISING THE 
EXPECTED COST OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The symmetry of the ordinary civil case is wholly absent in the 
criminal trial. Whereas in the ordinary civil trial an error against 
either party is considered equally regrettable, no such equation 
holds in the criminal trial. As Deane J of the High Court of 
Australia observes:  
[T]he searing injustice and consequential social injury 
which is involved when the law turns upon itself and 
convicts an innocent person far outweigh the failure of 
justice and the consequential social injury involved 
when the processes of the law proclaim the innocence 
of a guilty one.42 
As a result, the criminal standard of proof is almost universally 
recognised as being higher than the civil standard. While, on 
 
38  Kaye, above n 14, 604 (emphasis added). 
39  Koehler and Shaviro, above n 1, 250 (emphasis added). 
40  See also Redmayne, above n 2, 169. 
41  Specific challenges may be made to fact-finders’ probability assessments on 
the basis of doubts about the validity of certain exclusion rules. Eg Givelber 
suggests that many of the doubts jurors have about guilt result from 
exclusion rules that protect the guilty rather than the innocent, undermining 
the assumption that ‘one [would] have the greatest doubt about a 
proposition that is not true’: Givelber, above n 35, 1368.  
42  Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82 ALR 10, 31 (Deane J). The classic 
statement in the US is provided by Harlan J in Re Winship 397 US 358 
(1970), 370–372 (Harlan J conc); see also ibid 363–364 (Brennan J); 
Jackson v Delaware L&W RR 170 Atl 22 (1933), 23–24 discussed by 
Vaughan C Ball, ‘The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards 
of Proof’ (1961) 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 807, 815. 
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occasions, judges have questioned whether the distinction 
between the two standards is ‘more a matter of words than of 
substance’43 the better view is that ‘it is a matter of critical 
substance’.44 The most common formulation of the criminal 
standard, achieving the level of constitutional necessity in the 
United States, requires proof of guilt ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’.45  
It has long been fashionable to describe by ratio precisely how 
much worse it is to convict the innocent than to acquit the guilty. 
Perhaps the most famous is Blackstone’s maxim of 1765 that ‘it 
is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
should suffer’.46 However, this was just the midpoint in a steadily 
rising trend. Other commentators recommended ratios of 5:1,47 
20:1,48 and even 99:1.49 In 1829 Bentham warned that 
insufficient attention was being given to the ever increasing 
difficulty that this would pose for the prosecution of crime: ‘we 
must be on our guard against those sentimental exaggerations 
which tend to give crime impunity, under the pretext of insuring 
the safety of innocence’.50  
 
43  Edmunds v Edmunds and Ayscough (1935) VLR 177, 183, quoted with 
apparent approval in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 353 
(Starke J); see also 368 (Dixon J); R v Hepworth & Fearnley [1955] 2 QB 
600, 603 (Lord Goddard); Khawaja v Secretary of State [1984] AC 74, 112 
(Lord Scarman); US v Feinberg 140 F2d 952 (1944) (Learned Hand J); 
Larson v Jo Ann Cab Corp 209 F2d 929 (1954). 
44  Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521; see also Briginshaw v 
Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 344 (Latham CJ)); Bater v Bater [1951] P 
35, 36 (Denning LJ); Addington v Texas 441 US 418 (1978), 424–425, 426–
427. 
45  Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970); Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28;  
R v Hepworth and Fearnley [1955] 2 QB 600. 
46  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) Vol 4,  
c 27, 352. 
47  Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1678), 289. 
48  John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (Amos’ translation, 1825). 
49  Schlup v Delo 513 US 298 (1995), 325, quoting Starkie, Evidence (3rd ed, 
1830), 751.  
50  Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure (1829) 169, quoted in 
William S Laufer, ‘The Rhetoric of Innocence’ (1995) 70 Washington Law 
Review 329, 333 fn 17.  
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More recently, decision theorists have developed a method by 
which the relative weights attached to the competing objectives 
can be converted into probabilistic standards of proof — putting 
a figure to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This method of utility 
modelling now provides the ‘standard’51 or ‘conventional’52 
understanding of standards of proof.53 The starting point is to 
arrive at a numerical measure of the utility of the two possible 
correct outcomes and the two possible mistaken outcomes: UCG 
— convicting the guilty; UAI — acquitting the innocent; UAG — 
acquitting the guilty; UCI — convicting the innocent. In reality, 
the utility of a verdict will have one of two values, depending on 
whether it is right or wrong. But reality is inaccessible — some 
degree of uncertainty appears unavoidable — and it is therefore 
necessary to talk in terms of the utility that is expected from a 
verdict given the fact-finder’s probability of guilt, p. The 
expected utility of a conviction will rise from a minimum of UCI 
where p = 0, to a maximum of UCG where p = 1. For any p, the 
expected utility, EC, of a conviction is:  
EUC = p . UCG + (1 – p) . UCI  (1) 
Similarly, the expected utility of an acquittal, EUA, is: 
EUA = p . UAG + (1 – p) . UAI  (2) 
 
51  Allen et al, above n 9, (22 August 1994) 309 (Friedman R). See eg, John 
Kaplan, ‘Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process’ (1968) 20 Stanford 
Law Review 1065, 1066–1083; Lawrence Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971) 84 Harvard Law Review 
1329, 1378–1386; Richard Lempert, ‘Modelling Relevance’ (1977) 75 
Michigan Law Review 1021, 1032–1034; Andrew Ligertwood, ‘The 
uncertainty of proof’ (1976) 10 Melbourne University Law Review 367, 
368–370; Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (2nd ed, 
1983) 114–5; Bernard Robertson and G Anthony Vignaux, Interpreting 
Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom (1995) 77–79; 
DeKay, above n 37; Redmayne, above n 2, 167–74. 
52  Nance, above n 9, 622.  
53  Strangely Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, recently criticised the 
probabilistic theory of proof on the basis that it ‘does not explain how … a 
[decision] criterion is chosen, nor even whether the criterion is constant or 
variable’. (Above n 18, 30.) Perhaps they were making the point that ‘there 
is nothing in probability theory per se which could tell us where to put the 
critical levels … [This] obviously depends in some way on value judgments 
as well as on probabilities …’: Jaynes, above n 31, 1301.  
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EC and EA are both linear functions of p. They are graphed in 
Figure 1 for one plausible interpretation of Blackstone’s 10:1 
ratio. The erroneous verdicts carry a negative utility, or harm, of 
UAG = –1 and UCI = –10. Blackstone made no explicit reference 
to the utility of the correct verdicts, and, for the time being, these 
can be assigned zero utility: UCG = 0; UAI = 0. Also graphed is 
the expected utility of the preferred verdict, which is simply the 
maximum of EUC and EUA. This V-shaped function has a critical 
point where EUC and EUA intersect. This critical point represents 
the standard of proof, which can be calculated as follows: 
UAI – UCI 
 SP = 
UCG – UCI + UAI – UAG 
(3) 
For probability levels below the standard of proof, the preferred 
verdict is an acquittal. For probability levels above the standard 
of proof, the preferred verdict is a conviction. Where the 
probability is precisely equal to the standard of proof, the two 
verdicts will carry the same expected utility. It is one of the 
functions of the burden of persuasion to resolve such a tie. 
On this interpretation of Blackstone’s 10:1 ratio the criminal 
standard of proof would translate into a probabilistic standard of 
91 per cent. However, as noted, there was some uncertainty 
about Blackstone’s meaning as he made no reference to the 
utility of the correct outcomes. 
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Figure 1 Expected utilities and standards of proof 
It is arguable that Blackstone’s ratio should be interpreted, not in 
terms of utilities, but in terms of the closely related notion of 
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costs.54 The cost of convicting the innocent is defined as the 
difference between the utility of acquitting the innocent and the 
(negative) utility of convicting the innocent.  
CCI = UAI – UCI (4) 
Thus defined, it takes account both of the benefit of the correct 
outcome and the harm of the erroneous outcome. The cost of 
acquitting the guilty is similarly defined. 
CAG = UCG – UAG (5) 
Then the standard of proof can then be expressed more simply in 
terms of the two costs, rather than the four utilities.55 
CCI 
 SP = 
CCI + CAG
(6) 
Where the correct outcomes are assigned zero utility, as was 
done above for Blackstone’s ratio, the disutility of error equals 
the cost of error, and so applying (6) to Blackstone would still 
result in a 91 per cent standard. 
The other commentators mentioned above also spoke only in 
terms of the erroneous outcomes, and so they may be best 
interpreted as laying down cost ratios. Applying (6), the various 
commentators prescribe the probabilistic standards appearing in 
Table 1. The greater the cost of an erroneous conviction relative 
to a mistaken acquittal, the higher the criminal standard of proof. 
Note also that if the two errors are considered to produce carry an 
equal cost, as in ordinary civil cases, the V-shaped function is 
symmetrical about a standard of proof 50 per cent. The expected 
                                                 
54  DeKay, above n 37, 99–100. 
55  As well as involving fewer terms, a further advantage of the cost analysis 
over the utility analysis is that it does not raise the awkward question of 
identifying the zero point. Costs are intervals, without direction, whereas 
utilities have a direction and length, relative to a zero point. In some 
circumstances the zero point can be taken as measuring the utility of the 
present situation: an improved situation has positive utility, while a worse 
situation has negative utility. Alternatively, one may set the best outcome as 
the zero point, and measure all the worse outcomes relative to that. DeKay 
suggests that ‘[f]or the purpose of determining the optimal threshold, it 
simply does not matter where zero falls’. (Ibid 117.) On this view it would 
not matter which convention was adopted. Nevertheless, for reasons 
outlined in the text, I would not advocate the abolition of the four utilities in 
favour of the two costs.  
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cost of error will be minimised simply by adopting the more 
probable version of events, the one that is least likely to be 
erroneous.  
Table 1 Disutility ratios and standards of proof 
Commentator Cost ratio 
CCI:CAG 
Standard of proof 
 Hale (1678)  5:1  0.83 
 Blackstone (1765)  10:1  0.91 
 Fortescue (1825)  20:1  0.95 
 Starkie (1865)  99:1  0.99 
While it is simpler to talk in terms of the costs of the two 
possible errors rather than the utilities of the four possible 
outcomes, sight should not be lost of the benefits — and harms 
— of ‘correct’ outcomes. Laufer claims that ‘[l]egal scholarship 
assumes’ that acquitting the innocent is the ‘best’ outcome, better 
than convicting the guilty.56 However, this assumption, or 
perhaps Laufer’s claim, is questionable. A conviction of a guilty 
defendant offers the greatest value in terms of deterrence, 
retribution and rehabilitation. The resources of the judicial 
system and any private interests will have been well spent. 
However, the acquittal of an innocent defendant, although a 
‘correct’ outcome in one sense, signifies an incorrect 
prosecution. Resources have been expended in vain, and despite 
the acquittal, irreversible damage may have been caused to the 
defendant’s reputation and relationships.57 Meanwhile, assuming 
that the flaw in the prosecution concerned identification rather 
commission, the guilty party will still be at large. An 
appreciation of this would drive the standard of proof down, 
making it easier for the prosecution to obtain a conviction. In 
setting the standard of proof, attention should be paid to all the 
possible outcomes of a trial. The utility analysis can be reduced 
to a simpler cost analysis, but something may be lost in the 
reduction.  
 
56  Laufer, above n 50, 396 fn 309, citing only Terry Connolly, ‘Decision 
Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous Acquittals’ (1987) 
11 Law and Human Behavior 101, 101. 
57  Leipold, above n 17, 1298. 
 Probabilistic Standards of Proof  87 
 
 
                                                
IV STANDARDS, ERROR RATES AND PROBABILITY 
DISTRIBUTIONS  
Having regard to the seriousness of a wrongful conviction 
relative to a mistaken acquittal, the criminal standard is a 
stringent one. Increasing the standard reduces the risk of a 
wrongful conviction, but increases the risk of a mistaken 
acquittal. As noted above, the 50 per cent civil standard 
minimises the expected overall error rate. That there is a 
relationship between standards of proof and expected error rates 
is clear. However, the precise nature of the relationship is not as 
straightforward as might be supposed.  
Ligertwood is not entirely correct in suggesting that ‘[a] standard 
of criminal guilt of 0.9 means that of every 100 persons 
convicted, 10 will be wrongly convicted.’58 Nor is Glanville 
Williams correct in stating: ‘convicting in a criminal case on a 
probability of 0.95, high though that may seem at first sight, 
involves the probability of convicting one innocent person in 
20’.59 First, as noted above, it is only possible to talk of 
subjective expected error rates rather than actual error rates. And 
even then, the error rates that Ligertwood and Williams identify 
are the maximum expected error rates for the given standards of 
proof. Ligertwood and Williams assume that every case will be 
extremely difficult to decide, with the probability of guilt only 
just exceeding the standard of proof. Depending upon the degree 
of certainty obtained in the flow of cases the expected error rate 
may be much lower. If each case was proved to virtual certainty, 
the expected number of incorrect convictions would be close to 
zero. The expected error rate depends not only on the standard of 
proof, but also upon the probability distribution for the body of 
cases. The precise mathematical relationship can be described as 
follows. 
Let the probability distribution be represented by the function 
n(p), where n is the number of cases where guilt has been proved 
to a subjective probability level p. With standard of proof, SP, 
we can draw the conclusions appearing in Table 2.  
 
58  Andrew Ligertwood, Australian Evidence (3rd ed, 1998) 32. 
59  Glanville Williams, ‘The Mathematics of Proof’ [1979] Crim LR 297, 305–
306. 
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Table 2 Expected outcomes of a probability distribution of  
contested cases 
 
Note that this analysis assumes that the probability of guilt and 
the standard of proof can be identified with exact precision, and 
so there is a vanishingly small number of cases where the two are 
equal. In reality there will be cases where the fact-finder 
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experiences a higher-order uncertainty as to whether the 
probability of guilt lies above or below the standard of proof, 
such cases being resolved against the party bearing the legal 
burden of proof.60 
From these basic quantities, proportions are easily calculated: the 
prosecution’s rate of success in achieving convictions is NC/N; 
the error rate for convictions is FC/NC; the overall error rate is 
(FC + FA)/N; and so on. Graphical representations of these 
quantities and proportions for several different probability 
distributions appear in the figures below. 
The numbers of convictions and acquittals and the error rates are 
largely determined by the shape of the probability distribution. 
Of course, this ultimately is an empirical question without clear 
data. Statistics are available for the number of cases ending in 
convictions and acquittals,61 but we do not have any figures 
indicating the fact-finders’ raw probability assessments lying 
behind their verdicts. Furthermore, ‘[w]e naturally have no 
statistics about the number of cases in which the court has 
believed the wrong man’.62 And, Frankel’s claim 
notwithstanding, it cannot be said to be a ‘statistical fact ... that 
the preponderant majority of those brought to trial did 
substantially what they are charged with’.63 It is, however, 
interesting to speculate as to the possible shape of the probability 
distribution of cases going to trial, and to calculate the expected 
rates of outcomes, correct and mistaken, that would result from 
the application of different standards of proof to such 
distributions. 
                                                 
60  See eg Charles R Williams, above n 2, 169: ‘The legal burden is decisive 
when the evidence is evenly balanced’. 
61  See eg, the figures published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(US). 
62  Richard Eggleston, ‘What is wrong with the adversarial system?’ (1975) 49 
Australian Law Journal 428, 431.  
63  Frankel, above n 1, 1037 (emphasis added). Wagenaar, van Koppen and 
Crombag, above n 18, 12, more accurately talk in terms of the ‘generally 
accepted but hardly testable assumption that about 95 per cent of all 
defendants are actually guilty’.  
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Perhaps, in the absence of any data to the contrary, we should 
apply the principle of indifference.64 If there is no reason to think 
that any particular probability assessment would be more 
common than any other, then we should assume a totally flat 
distribution with equal numbers of cases at each probability level 
(Figure 2); n(p) equals a constant. The diagonal line represents 
the function p.n(p) — the expected number of cases at each 
probability level in which the defendant is actually guilty. The 
intersection of this function with the standard of proof divides 
the probability distribution into four regions: true acquittals 
(TA), false acquittals (FA), true convictions (TC) and false 
convictions (FC).65  
Figure 2(a) shows the impact of a Blackstonian standard of proof 
of 91 per cent on this distribution. Ninety-one per cent of the 
cases would result in acquittals, and 9 per cent in convictions. 
Forty-six per cent of the acquittals would be considered mistaken 
(FA), as would five per cent of the convictions (FC). By way of 
comparison Figure 2(b) shows the difference that would result 
from a standard of proof of 50 per cent. Half the cases would 
result in acquittals and half in convictions, and 25 per cent of 
each would be expected to be incorrect.  
As expected, the result of increasing the standard has been to 
decrease the rate of mistaken convictions, but at the expense of 
mistaken acquittals, and overall accuracy. The overall error rate 
has increased from 25 per cent to 42 per cent. 
The flat distribution might be warranted if we were totally 
ignorant as to its appearance. However, positive arguments can 
be put for alternative shapes. A realist, for example, might argue 
that the distribution would have more of a U-shape (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
64  See eg Donald Gillies, Philosophical Theories of Probability (2000) 35. 
65  I am grateful to Geoff Hamer for suggesting the addition of this function to 
the graph which greatly increases its explanatory power.  
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(b) 
Figure 2 Flat distribution 
The factual questions that arise out of criminal charges do have 
definite answers, and, given the competing parties’ motivation to 
gather and present all available evidence favouring either side, 
the fact-finder should be able to achieve some degree of certainty 
in the defendant’s guilt or innocence in the majority of cases. 
Conceding that absolute certainty is unachievable, the 
distribution would tail down sharply at either end. Figure 3(a) 
shows that with a 91 per cent standard of proof, 88 per cent of 
cases would end in an acquittal and 12 per cent in a conviction. 
Forty-four per cent of the acquittals would be expected to be 
incorrect (FA), as would five per cent of the convictions (FC). 
The expected overall error rate would be 39 per cent.  
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(b) 
Figure 3 Realist distribution 
As illustrated in Figure 3(b), with a 50 per cent standard, the 
symmetry of the distribution would result in half acquittals and 
half convictions. Twenty-one per cent of the acquittals would be 
expected to be mistaken (FA) and 20 per cent of the convictions 
(FC). The effect of the increased standard of proof is as 
previously noted — the expected rate of mistaken convictions is 
reduced, but with an increase in the expected rate of mistaken 
acquittals, and an increase in the expected overall error rate. 
Given the greater certainty in the U-shaped distribution, the 
expected error rates are lower than those for the flat distribution. 
Whatever the merits of its realist foundations in other settings, it 
is arguable that the U-shaped distribution displays a lack of 
appreciations of the realities of litigation. The vast bulk of the 
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cases where the available evidence offers virtual certainty would 
never get to court. If the probability of guilt clearly exceeded the 
standard of proof, the defendant would plead guilty to avoid the 
public ordeal of trial and in the hope of obtaining a lighter 
penalty. If the probability of guilt fell far short of the standard, 
the prosecution would not waste resources in pursuing the 
charges. It is only the ‘hard cases’, those where the probability of 
guilt is near the standard with each party seeing some chance of 
success, that would go to trial to be decided by the application of 
the standard of proof.  
The force of this argument depends, in part, on the extent to 
which the parties have a grasp on all of the evidence and can 
predict how it will appear to the fact-finder. It is undermined by 
‘the unpredictable hazards of the forensic process’.66 It is also 
arguable that the parties’ determination to litigate would be 
influenced to some degree by their perception of the underlying 
reality — the criminal defendant’s belief in her innocence, the 
plaintiff’s certainty that the defendant is responsible for her 
injuries — regardless of the evidence.67 And if a party thinks she 
has little or nothing to gain by settling before trial — consider for 
example a criminal trial in which the prosecution was likely to 
insist upon the maximum penalty — cases may tend to reach trial 
despite decisive evidence in the other party’s favour. Whereas 
the hard-cases reasoning suggests that the distribution would be 
concentrated about the standard of proof, these factors would 
tend spread at least some the distribution across the width of the 
unit interval. Applying the hard-cases reasoning to the 
Blackstonian ratio, we might expect the cases to form a normal 
distribution centred on 91 per cent, as in Figure 4(a).  
 
66  Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074, 1092 (Lord 
Bridge); see also Redmayne, above n 2, 182; Barbara D Underwood, ‘The 
Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases’ 
(1977) 86 Yale LJ 1299, 1335. Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court in 
Santosky v Kramer 455 US 745 (1982) 757, assumed that the strength of the 
evidence appropriately impacted upon the parties’ litigious behaviour, 
suggesting that ‘the standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in 
advance’. Compare George M Dery III, ‘The Atrophying of the Reasonable 
Doubt Standard: The United States Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity in 
Victor v Nebraska And Its Implications in the Courtroom’ (1995) 99 
Dickinson Law Review 613, 614; Hay, above n 15, 657. 
67  See also Givelber, above n 35, 1367. 
(2004) 1 UNELJ 94 David Hamer  
The distribution is symmetrical about the standard of proof, and 
so the cases would be split evenly between acquittals and 
convictions. However, the vast bulk of the distribution lies 
towards the certain guilt end of the unit interval. The result is that 
89 per cent of the acquittals would be expected to be mistaken 
(FA), but only 8 per cent of the convictions (FC). Overall, the 
expected error rate is 53 per cent. If the standard of proof were 
decreased, the hard-cases reasoning suggests the distribution 
would also shift down the probability scale. In Figure 4(b) we 
see the corresponding normal distribution centred on 0.50. The 
symmetry of the distribution means that half the cases will result 
in acquittals and half in convictions, 48 per cent of each will be 
expected to be erroneous. Once again, the higher standard 
reduces the expected rate of wrongful convictions, but increases 
the expected rate of erroneous acquittals, and the overall error 
rate. 
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Figure 4 ‘Hard cases’ distributions 
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Comparing the three distributions, it is unsurprising that the 
greatest expected accuracy is offered by the ‘realist’ U-shaped 
distribution in which relatively high certainty is attained in most 
cases. The highest error rates are expected in the ‘hard-case’ 
normal distribution which assumes that the realist’s easy cases 
never get to court. Common to all three distributions is the notion 
that to reduce the risk of one error-type is to increase the risk of 
the other error-type. The trade-off appears unavoidable.68  
It appears inconsistent with this latter observation for 
commentators to advance prescriptions that putatively reduce 
both error types. Newman argues that the courts’ ‘unwillingness 
to apply the “reasonable doubt” standard rigorously has resulted 
not only in some unjust convictions, it has also precipitated some 
unwarranted acquittals’, conceding that this appears to be a 
‘paradoxical effect’.69 Givelber similarly suggests that ‘[t]o a 
surprising degree, the risks [of each error-type] are unrelated’.70 
However, the paradoxical nature of these comments can be 
resolved by recognising that they stem from recommendations 
for reform that extend beyond the criminal standard of proof. 
Newman recommends ‘broaden[ing] the categories of evidence 
that juries are permitted to hear … so that the standard might 
serve as a more precise divider of the guilty from the innocent’.71 
Givelber also expresses concern about the exclusion of relevant 
evidence72 and other of the ‘current processes [that] compromise 
the criminal justice system’s ability to identify the innocent as 
well as the guilty’.73 In effect they both suggest reforms to the 
system that will provide fact-finders with a greater quantity of 
relevant evidence and more coherent guidance in its use, 
enabling them to get closer to the real facts, and reduce the 
number of hard cases.74 It is arguable, however, that the impact 
of such reforms, if successful, would be in the shadow of the trial 
court, with an increase in warranted guilty pleas and the dropping 
 
68  See also Underwood, above n 66, 1331. 
69  Jon O Newman, ‘Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”’ (1993) 68 New York 
University Law Review 979, 1000; see also at 980. 
70  Givelber, above n 35, 1321. 
71  Newman, above n 69, 1000 (emphasis added). 
72  Givelber, above n 35, 1378, 1394. 
73  Ibid 1396 (emphasis added). 
74  Underwood, above n 66, 1333.  
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of unjustified charges. The staple of the court’s reduced diet 
would be likely to remain one of hard cases.  
V THE COMPLEMENTARY STANDARDS OF THE 
PROSECUTION AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 
In Parts II and III probability theory was employed to explore the 
rationale behind the contrasting civil and criminal standards of 
proof, and Part IV examined the expected error rates that the 
contrasting standards would produce for different probability 
distributions. This Part concerns another aspect of probabilistic 
standards of proof. While it is common to refer to the standard of 
proof that must be met by a single party, usually the plaintiff or 
prosecution, probability theory implies that a standard of proof is 
also applicable to the defendant, the two standards being 
complementary, in combination making up the unit probability 
interval. 
In discussing the ordinary civil standard above, I noted that 
effectively both parties are presented with the same standard of 
proof. The plaintiff will seek to show that it is more probable 
than not that the defendant is liable. Likewise, it is in the 
defendant’s interest to establish that it is more probable than not 
that she is not liable. Each standard is 0.5, and these are 
complementary, summing to unity. Less obviously, in criminal 
trials, there are also two complementary criminal standards, one 
for the prosecution and one for the defendant.75  
 
75  See also John T McNaughton, ‘Burden of Production of Evidence: A 
Function of a Burden of Persuasion’ (1955) 68 Harvard Law Review 1382, 
1382–1383; Robert C Power, ‘Reasonable and Other Doubts: The Problem 
of Jury Instructions’ (1999) 67 Tennessee Law Review 45, 74. R Allen, 
‘Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered’ (1981) 66 Iowa Law Review 
843, 327 fn 22, suggests that the defendant’s standard is the ‘reciprocal’ of 
the prosecution’s standard. In its everyday meaning this may appear an 
appropriate term, but, mathematically, the term is incorrect. The reciprocal 
of 1/2 is 2; the product of a number and its reciprocal is one. ‘Complement’ 
is a better term. The complement of 1/2 is 
1/2; the sum of a number and its 
complement is one. The two complementary standards, added together, 
make up the unit probability interval. This is an instance of the addition 
law, one of the fundamental axioms of probability theory. See Gillies, 
above n 64, 59.  
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The two complementary criminal standards are most apparent if 
expressed probabilistically. As discussed above, the Blackstonian 
10:1 ratio suggests that the prosecution needs to prove the 
defendant’s guilt to a probability of greater than 0.91 to obtain a 
conviction. At the same time the defendant will need to prove 
that her innocence has a probability greater than 0.09 per cent, to 
secure an acquittal. The two standards, 0.91 per cent and 0.09 per 
cent are complementary summing to unity. In general, if the 
prosecution needs to prove guilt to a standard of S to obtain a 
conviction, then the defendant the defendant’s complementary 
standard is 1 – S. (See Figure 5.) 
 
Figure 5 Complementary standards 
A Inadvertent Interchange 
The two complementary criminal standards are readily identified 
in numerical formulations. The two are also discernible in verbal 
formulations, however, these are less clearly identified and trial 
judges have, on occasions, got the two confused.76 The 
prosecution must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to 
obtain a conviction. It is in the defendant’s interest to ensure 
there is a reasonable doubt about her guilt in order to secure an 
acquittal. However, in Agnew v US77 the trial judge instructed the 
                                                 
76  See also Power, above n 75, 77–78. 
77  165 US 36 (1897). 
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jury that there is a rebuttable presumption ‘that every man 
intends the legitimate consequences of his own acts’78 and that 
the evidence in rebuttal ‘must be sufficiently strong to satisfy 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no such guilty 
intent’.79 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not take the error 
seriously, holding that although this ‘was open to objection for 
want of accuracy, we are unable to perceive that this could have 
tended to prejudice the defendant when the charge is considered 
as a whole.’80  
There are a number of alternative definitions of the criminal 
standard beyond the classic ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
formulation. These also imply two complementary standards 
which trial judges, on occasions, have got the wrong way around. 
In Dunn v Perrin81 the trial judge instructed the jury that a 
‘reasonable doubt’ was ‘such a strong and abiding conviction as 
still remains after careful consideration of all the facts and 
arguments’. The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit commented 
that this was ‘exact inverse of what it should have been’.82 The 
trial judge was actually describing proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, not a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s appeal was 
upheld.  
Another popular formulation suggests that proof beyond 
reasonable doubt is ‘proof of such a convincing character that 
you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in 
the most important of your own affairs’.83 In Holland v US84 the 
trial judge defined ‘reasonable doubt’ as ‘the kind of doubt … 
which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your 
own lives might be willing to act upon’.85 Again, the trial judge 
got the two standards mixed up. ‘[T]he charge should have been 
in terms of the kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate 
 
78  Ibid 53. 
79  Ibid 49.  
80  Ibid 50. 
81  570 F2d 21 (1st Cir, 1978). 
82  Ibid 24. 
83  US v Williams 20 F3d 125 (5th Cir, 1994), 129. 
84  348 US 121 (1954). 
85  Ibid 140 (emphasis added). 
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to act’.86 However, the Supreme Court again brushed the error 
aside, suggesting that this ‘would seem to create confusion rather 
than misapprehension … [and] that, taken as a whole, the 
instructions correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt 
to the jury.’ It is regrettable that an interchanging of the 
prosecution’s standard and the defendant’s complementary 
standard was once more taken so lightly. These decisions may 
need to be reconsidered in the light of the Supreme Court’s 
increased awareness of proof beyond reasonable doubt as a 
constitutionally mandated standard.87 
B Circumstantial Direction 
Another way of expressing the defendant’s complement of the 
beyond-reasonable-doubt standard is as follows: ‘if there is any 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the [defendant’s] 
innocence’88 there should be an acquittal. The High Court of 
Australia has described this complementary proposition as an 
‘amplification’89 of the classic beyond-reasonable-doubt 
formulation, holding that it will not always be necessary for the 
trial judge include this in her directions to the jury. In Shepherd 
Dawson J suggested that it can be ‘helpful’ where the 
 
86  Ibid (emphasis added); see also Holt v US 218 US 245 (1910), 254 
(‘hesitate to act’) and Hopt v Utah 120 US 430 (1887), 439 (‘willing to 
act’). 
87  Eg Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970). But see George M Dery III, ‘The 
Atrophying of the Reasonable Doubt Standard: The United States Supreme 
Court’s Missed Opportunity in Victor v Nebraska And its Implications in 
the Courtroom’ (1995) 99 Dickinson Law Review 613, discussing Victor v 
Nebraska 114 S Ct 1239 (1994). 
88  Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619, 630 (Griffith CJ); see also ibid 
634; Hodges Case (1838) 2 Lewin 228; 168 ER 1136; Martin v Osborne 
(1936) 55 CLR 367, 375, 378 (Dixon J), 381–382 (Evatt J); Thomas v The 
Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584, 605–606; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 
234, 243 (Dixon CJ), 252 (Menzies J); Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 
82, 104 (Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ), 109 (Murphy J); Knight v The 
Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495, 502 (Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 511 
(Brennan and Gaudron JJ).  
89  Grant v The Queen (1975) 11 CLR 503, 505 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, 
Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ agreeing); Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 
CLR 495, 502 (Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
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prosecution relies heavily on circumstantial evidence,90 but ‘may 
be confusing rather than helpful’ where the prosecution relies 
primarily on direct evidence.91  
The rationale of providing the ‘reasonable hypothesis’ direction 
in circumstantial cases is that, while circumstantial evidence can 
be just as strong as direct evidence, it invites a different form of 
reasoning. ‘To say the two types of evidence are equal in weight 
… is not to say that they are equal in all respects.’92 Whereas 
direct evidence ‘expressly narrate[s]’93 the ultimate fact with 
respect to which it was adduced, circumstantial evidence narrates 
a fact more or less remote from the ultimate fact. The fact-finder 
is required to traverse the gap between the narrated fact and the 
ultimate fact by an interpretative act, and this carries a certain 
risk. There is greater scope for ‘conjecture and speculation’.94 In 
the seminal case on the circumstantial evidence direction Baron 
Alderson warned that’[t]he mind [can be too] apt to take a 
pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even 
straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of 
one connected whole’.95 More recently, Onion J of the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals noted the view that ‘people have a 
 
90  Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573, 578 (Dawson J); see also Grant v The 
Queen (1975) 11 ALR 503, 504 (Barwick CJ); Peacock v The King (1912) 
13 CLR 619, 630 (Griffith CJ). 
91  Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573, 578 (Dawson J). 
92  Hankins v State 646 SW2d 191 (1983), 215 (Onion J, diss), quoting from 
State v Lasley 583 SW2d 511 (1979). 
93  Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (Hunt and Clarke 1827), 
3:7–8; discussed in Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative 
and Circumstantial Evidence in England (1992), 36. See also Shepherd v R 
(1990) 170 CLR 573, 579; William Wills, Wills on Circumstantial 
Evidence (6th ed, 1912) 412. 
94  Hankins v State 646 SW 2d 191 (1983), 207, 217 (Onion J, diss). 
95  Baron Alderson in Hodges Case (1838) 2 Lewin 228; 168 ER 1136, as 
discussed in Wills, above n 93, 48. See also Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 
182 CLR 461, 536 (McHugh J); Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, 
‘Explaining the evidence: Tests of the story model for jury decision-
making’ (1992) 62 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 189, 252; 
W Lance Bennet, and Martha Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the 
Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (1981) 66–68; 
Wagenaar, van Koppen, and Crombag, above n 18, 141–3, 211, 218; Paul 
Bergman and Alan Moore, ‘Mistrial by likelihood ratio: Bayesian analysis 
meets the F word’ (1991) 13 Cardozo Law Review 589, 602. 
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psychological propensity to weave theories from circumstantial 
evidence and then to defend their theories because of vanity or 
pride’.96 For this reason, it is ‘necessary to warn the jury against 
the danger of being misled by a train of circumstantial 
evidence’.97 It may be helpful to direct the jury that it is not 
enough that the defendant’s guilt be a ‘rational inference … it 
should be “the only rational inference that the circumstances 
would enable them to draw”’.98 ‘In the ordered processes of 
logical thought … regard must be had to every hypothesis which 
can compete with the hypothesis suggested by experience and 
knowledge of human affairs.’99 The story of guilt may be 
attractive, but the jury must also consider whether stories of 
innocence are also open. If any such story appears reasonable the 
defendant should be acquitted.100 
A number of United States courts have misunderstood the logic 
of the ‘reasonable hypothesis’ direction, resulting in a relaxation 
of the prosecution’s standard of proof. The confusion appears to 
have begun with the Supreme Court in Holland v US, although 
properly understood, the decision is unproblematic.101 One of the 
defendants’ grounds of appeal was that the trial judge had failed 
to provide a ‘reasonable hypothesis’ direction even though the 
prosecution case was entirely circumstantial. In a unanimous 
judgment delivered by Clark J the appeal was dismissed. The 
court held that ‘where the jury is properly instructed on the 
 
96  Hankins v State 646 SW2d 191 (1983), 204–205. 
97  Baron Alderson in Hodges Case (1838) 2 Lewin 228; 168 ER 1136, as 
discussed in Wills, above n 93, 48. 
98  Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234, 252, quoted in Barca v The 
Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82, 104 (Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ).  
99  Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367, 381 (Evatt J). 
100  The potential weaknesses of circumstantial evidence should not diminish 
the fact that the directness of eye-witness evidence carries its own dangers. 
(See eg Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (revised ed, 1986); R v 
Turnbull [1977] QB 224; Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170, 182; 
Hampton v State 285 NW2d 868 (1979), 872.) Indeed, an accumulation of 
circumstantial evidence may appear far stronger than a single eyewitness: 
‘[C]ircumstances cannot lie or be mistaken, whereas witnesses can’.  
(TC Brennan, ‘Circumstantial Evidence’ (1930) 4 Australian Law Journal 
106, 106; see also Welsh, above n 93, 16.) The reasoning behind this is that 
‘a narrative cannot be shaped from circumstantial evidence without 
considerably more work than goes into most lies’. (Welsh, above n 93, 17.) 
101  348 US 121 (1954). 
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standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on 
circumstantial is confusing and incorrect’.102 It appears clear in 
the context of the case that the court was questioning the 
necessity for the direction, and not its logic. The court recognised 
that ‘the cogency of [the prosecution’s] proof depends upon its 
effective negation of reasonable explanations by the [defendant] 
inconsistent with guilt’;103 if the defendants were able to offer a 
reasonable explanation — a reasonable hypothesis consistent 
with innocence — they would be entitled to an acquittal.  
In United States v La Rose104 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit provided a logically correct statement of the 
law: ‘in a circumstantial evidence case the inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence must not only be consistent with guilt but 
inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’105 
However, in United States v Scott106 the court declined to follow 
La Rose on the ground that it had failed to consider Holland and 
was ‘an aberration’.107 In United States v Stone108 the court held 
‘that circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict 
and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every 
 
102  Ibid 139–140 (emphasis added). 
103  Ibid 135. The court may have had concerns particular to the circumstances 
of that case. The defendant was convicted on charges of tax evasion, the 
prosecution pointing to an apparent increase in the defendant’s net worth 
over a given period far exceeding declared income. The taxpayer responded 
by offering a number of ‘leads’ – explanations as to how the money was in 
fact acquired prior to the relevant period. ‘Were the Government required to 
run down all such leads it would face grave investigative difficulties; still 
its failure to do so might jeopardize the position of the taxpayer.’ (Ibid 127; 
see also at 137–139.) Much of the reasoning in the case sought to resolve 
the conflict between these competing concerns. A ‘reasonable hypothesis’ 
direction may have been considered to tip the balance too far in the 
defendant’s favour. It is interesting to note that in Jackson v Virginia 443 
US 307 (1979), 318 fn 9, the Supreme Court suggested that the theory 
‘rejected’ in Holland was ‘that the prosecution was under an affirmative 
duty to rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt’; the court did not 
suggest that it was wrong to require the exclusion of every ‘reasonable’ 
hypothesis.  
104  459 F2d 361 (1972). 
105  Ibid 363, quoting from Fitzpatrick v US 410 F2d 513(1969), 516.  
106  578 F2d 1186 (1978). 
107  Ibid 1192. 
108  748 F2d 361 (1984). 
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reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt’,109 following Scott and 
expressly overruling La Rose.110 This statement is logically 
inconsistent with the Constitutional requirement that guilt be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt.111 If there is a reasonable 
hypothesis consistent with innocence, then there should be a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.  
The Sixth Circuit is not alone in its unconstitutional confusion. In 
Hankins v State112 a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal of 
Texas held that the ‘reasonable hypothesis’ principle is in 
‘conflict’113 with, and sets a ‘more rigorous standard’114 than the 
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. To an extent, this 
view may have been the product of an awkward formulation of 
the principle that was then conventional in Texas: the 
circumstantial evidence ‘must exclude, to a moral certainty, 
every other reasonable hypothesis, except the defendant’s guilt; 
and unless they do so, beyond a reasonable doubt, you will find 
the defendant not guilty.’115 As already outlined, a ‘reasonable 
hypothesis’ of innocence is basis for a reasonable doubt, and the 
expression ‘moral certainty’ is another version of the criminal 
standard.116 The Texas formulation is therefore, at best, doubly 
tautological; at worst it sets an exponentially higher standard 
than the proper criminal standard. The majority of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in Hankins was right to express disapproval of 
this instruction,117 But, as Onions J in dissent recognised, the 
‘reasonable hypothesis’ principle ‘is only another application of 
 
109  Ibid 362. 
110  Ibid 363. 
111  Re Winship 397 US 358 (1970), 364; see also Jackson v Virginia 443 US 
307 (1979).  
112  646 SW2d 191 (1983). 
113  Ibid 199. 
114  Ibid 198, quoting from State v LeClair 425 A2d 182 (1981).  
115  Hankins v State 646 SW2d 191 (1983), 207 (emphasis added), quoting the 
State Bar of Texas, Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges, §0.01 (1975). 
116  See eg Shapiro, above n 4. 
117  Hankins v State 646 SW2d 191 (1983), 200; see also Charles v State 955 
SW2d 400 (1997), 405. 
(2004) 1 UNELJ 104 David Hamer  
 
                                                
the doctrine of reasonable doubt’.118 The decisions in Hankins, 
Stone and Scott ‘have redefined the reasonable doubt standards in 
circumstantial evidence cases’.119  
In fact it is arguable that any weakness with the ‘reasonable 
hypothesis’ standard is in favour of the prosecution rather than 
the defendant. It might lead a juror to think that, to avoid 
prosecution, it must be possible to mould the evidence into a 
single concrete story of innocence. An assortment of weaknesses 
in the prosecution case — for example, evidence only of a weak 
motive, possible bias in the eyewitness, effective cross-
examination of the prosecution’s expert forensic witness, 
equivocal evidence of post-offence conduct — would not suffice; 
‘a generalized unease or scepticism about the prosecution’s 
evidence is not a valid basis to resist entreaties to vote for 
conviction’.120 The ‘reasonable hypothesis’ principle should not 
be interpreted as meaning ‘a doubt is reasonable only if the juror 
can articulate to himself or herself some particular reason for 
it.’121  
C Concerns Over Burden Reversal 
The present discussion may raise the objection that standards are 
not imposed on both parties. Only one party is required to satisfy 
the standard of proof, generally the plaintiff or prosecution, 
although exceptionally the defendant must prove an affirmative 
defence to a certain standard.122 In criminal cases in particular, to 
 
 
118  Hankins v State 646 SW2d 191 (1983), 206 (Onion J, diss), quoting from 
Hunt v State 7 Tex Ct App 212 (1879), 237–238. See also Hankins v State 
646 SW2d 191 (1983), 215–217 (Onion J, diss). 
119  Chambers, above n 17, 688. 
120  Newman, above n 69, 983. Newman was here addressing the definition of a 
reasonable doubt as ‘a doubt based on a reason’ (see also Thomas Mulrine, 
‘Reasonable Doubt: How in the World is it Defined?’ (1997) 12 American 
University Journal of International Law and Policy 195, 224). However, 
the comments have clear application to the ‘reasonable hypothesis’ 
principle. 
121  Newman, above n 69, 983 (emphasis added). 
122  Generally the defendant bears at most an evidential burden, requiring her to 
point to sufficient evidence to raise certain defences. The prosecution will 
then be required to negate the defence beyond reasonable doubt. The only 
common law exception to this is the insanity defence. The defendant bears a 
legal burden, and must prove the facts constituting the defence on the 
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talk in terms of the defendant’s standard of proof appears 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. But this 
objection is misplaced. It conflates the principles governing 
standards of proof with those governing the closely related topic 
of burdens of proof. It could be argued that the present 
discussion of standards of proof is incomplete due to its failure to 
address burdens of proof. But such an argument should not be 
permitted to divert attention from the fact that the probabilistic 
nature of standards of proof makes the existence of the 
complementary standards an inescapable fact. The confusions 
explored above indicate that it is better to acknowledge and 
understand the defendant’s standard than to pretend it does not 
exist.  
Solan suggests that even the classic ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
formulation may have a burden-shifting effect.123 He prefers a 
formulation which would require the jury to be ‘firmly 
convinced’ in the defendant’s guilt in order to convict. This, he 
suggests ‘focuses more on the government’s burden’,124 whereas 
the ‘reasonable doubt’ instruction ‘focus[es] the jury on the 
defendant’s ability to come up with alternative explanations’.125 
The classic formulation, he suggests, ‘encourages jurors to take 
the government’s case as a given and then challenges them to 
find alternatives’.126  
But, as Solan acknowledges, even his preferred formulation has 
its inevitable complement.127 A model instruction advanced by 
 
balance of probabilities. However, the general rule has been greatly 
weakened by numerous statutory defences which also impose the legal 
burden on the defendant. Such legislation raises concerns about the erosion 
of the presumption of innocence; however, the courts’ ability to override 
the legislation on this ground varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See eg 
Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462; Patterson 
v New York 432 US 197 (1977); R v Hunt [1987] 1 All ER 1; R v Lambert 
[2002] AC 545.  
123  Other aspects of the law of criminal proof raise far more genuine concerns 
about burden reversal. See previous n. 
124  Lawrence M Solan, ‘Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: 
Some Doubt about Reasonable Doubt’ (1999) 78 Texas Law Review 105, 
107. 
125  Ibid 129. 
126  Ibid 134. 
127  Ibid 144.  
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the Federal Judicial Center requires the jury to be ‘firmly 
convinced’ of the defendant’s guilt in order to convict, adding 
that the jury should acquit if they ‘think there is a real possibility 
that he is not guilty’.128 One could perceive equal burden-shifting 
risks with this instruction.129 The only version of the criminal 
standard that does not pose burden-shifting risks is the one with 
no complement — a standard requiring the prosecution to prove 
guilt to absolute certainty, a probability of one hundred per cent. 
But where empirical proof is involved some doubt appears 
inevitable. To require absolute certainty would be to give crime 
impunity. 
As stated at the outset, factual accuracy is the paramount goal of 
the trial. But it would be a perversion of this goal to seek to 
project a ‘myth of certainty’130 on the ground that ‘some things 
are best left unsaid’,131 or out of a concern that to acknowledge 
the risk of error would jeopardise ‘the continued confidence in 
the present system of criminal trial’.132 The standing of the 
judicial system would suffer far more from the debunking of the 
myth when inevitable miscarriages of justice occasionally came 
to light. The system is likely to maintain far greater health by the 
acknowledgement, rather than the concealment, of the 
fundamental fact that in administering criminal justice, ‘some 
risk of convicting the innocent must be run’.133 
 
128  Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions (1988) No 21, 
at 28. 
129  US v Porter 821 F 2d 968 (4th Cir, 1987). At 973 the court entertained the 
defendant’s argument that this shifted the burden: ‘Implying the evidence 
must show a real possibility of innocence to justify acquittal trenches on the 
principle that a defendant is presumed to be innocent.’ Ultimately, however, 
any such risk was overcome in other instructions. Contrast, US v Conway 
73 F 3d 975 (10th Cir, 1995) 981. See generally Power, above n 75, 84–85. 
130  Tribe, above n 51, 1373. 
131  Kaye, above n 34, 40. See also Tribe, above n 51, 1372; Nesson, above n 5, 
1225; Ligertwood, above n 58, 79. 
132  Ligertwood, above n 51, 387. 
133  Glanville Williams, The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal 
Trial (1963) 190; compare Daniel N Shaviro, ‘Statistical-Probability 
Evidence and the Appearance of Justice’ (1989) 103 Harvard Law Review 
530, 544. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the role played by standards of proof in 
the pursuit of factual accuracy at trial. Recognising that absolute 
certainty is generally unattainable and that some risk of error is 
unavoidable, standards of proof are set at probability levels that 
minimise the cost of expected errors. In the ordinary civil trial, 
an error against either party is considered to carry equal cost. A 
standard of 50 per cent directs the fact-finder to the verdict that is 
more probably correct, and an erroneous verdict in each case is 
not probable. Each party will be concerned to demonstrate that 
her version of facts is the more probable. In criminal trials a 
wrongful conviction is considered to carry a far greater cost than 
a mistaken acquittal. An elevated standard reduces the risk of the 
more serious error, at the same time inevitably increasing the risk 
of the lesser mistake. According to the most common 
formulation, the prosecution must show guilt is beyond 
reasonable doubt, and the defendant will seek to present a 
reasonable explanation of the evidence consistent with 
innocence. It is a corollary of the probabilistic nature of juridical 
proof that the opposing parties are both presented with 
complementary standards. 
The level at which a standard is set is a key determinant of the 
type of error that may occur. The other determining factor is the 
probability of guilt or liability that the fact-finder arrives at in 
each case. If absolute certainty were attainable, errors would be 
avoidable regardless of the standard of proof. The closer that a 
fact-finder is able to get to certainty, the greater the opportunity 
of avoiding error. In this article I have provided a clear statement 
of the mathematical relationship between the standard, the 
probability distribution and error rates. A realist may argue that 
evidence will generally be forthcoming enabling high levels of 
certainty and low error rates. However, many of these easy cases 
will be resolved before reaching court. The trial court is likely to 
be presented with the most difficult cases with a maximal risk of 
costly error. 

